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Freeman and Beilock: State Regulatory Responses to Federal Motor Carrier Reregulation

STATE REGULATORY RESPONSES TO FEDERAL
MOTOR CARRIER REREGULATION
JAMES FREEMAN*
RICHARD BEILOCK* *
INTRODUCTION

Regulatory and legislative initiatives during the past five years have wrought
major changes in the motor carrier industry.' Present motor carrier law and
policy have loosened considerably former restrictions on such strictly regulated
matters as carrier operating authority' and rate setting procedures. 3 Interstate
*Assistant Professor, Department of Management, College of Business and Economics,
University of Kentucky. B.S.E., 1971, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1976,
M.A., 1982, University of South Carolina; LL.M., 1978, Harvard Law School.
**Assistant Professor of Marketing and Transportation, Food and Resource Economics
Department, University of Florida. B.A., 1971, University of Colorado; M.S., 1978, Ph.D., 1981,
The Pennsylvania State University.
Editor's Note: This article addresses the effects of deregulation which were initially
examined three years ago in this Review. See Symposium, Trucking Deregulation, 32 U.
FLA. L. Rv. 843-954 (1980).
1. See, e.g., ICC OFFICE OF POLICY & ANALYsIs, The Effect of Regulatory Reform on the
Trucking Industry: Structure Conduct and Performance (June 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Effect of Regulatory Reform]; A Practice Primer for the Eighties, 14TH ANN. TPRANSP. L. INsT.
(1982) (Butterworths Legal Pub'l, Seattle, Wash.); Freeman & Gerson, Motor Carrier Operating Rights Proceedings-HowDo I Lose Thee?, 11 TRANSP. L.J. 13 (1979).
2. The ICC traditionally authorized grants of authority if the proposed operations were
consistent with the "public convenience and necessity." In Pan-American Bus Lines Operation,
I M.C.C. 190, 203 (1936), the ICC articulated three components comprising this standard:
whether the new operation or service will serve a useful public purpose in response to a
public demand or need; whether this purpose can and will be served as well by existing lines
or carriers; and whether it can be served by the proposed operation or service without
endangering or impairing the operations of existing carriers contrary to the public interest.
By 1976 the ICC was processing about 6,800 motor carrier operating authority cases per
year, I.C.C. ANNN. REP. 96 (1978), and granting approximately 80% in whole or in part on
the merits, 43 Fed. Reg. 56979 (1978). P. C. White Truck Line, Inc. v. ICC, 551 F.2d 1326
(D.C. Cir. 1977) required the Commission to consider the benefits of increased competition
and, in effect, negated the ICC's ability to deny an application because of claims by existing
common carriers that they were providing adequate service. In Liberty Trucking Co., Ext.
Gen. Commodities, 131 M.C.C. 573, 574 (1979), the Commission held once an applicant had

met its prima facie burden of establishing a need for the proposed service, an existing carrier
must demonstrate the grant would not be in the public interest. The public interest standard
requires proof that the carrier's ability to serve the public would be jeopardized if the application were approved.
Ex Parte No. MC-121, Policy Statement on Motor Carrier Regulation (issued Oct. 16, 1979),
shifted the burden of proving that an application would adversely affect the public interest
to the protestants. Section 5 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793,
codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10922 (Supp. IV 1980), reflects this change in the burden of proof,
thereby endorsing the shift in ICC policy away from protecting existing common carriers
and toward increased competition. Ex Parte No. MC-55 (Sub-No. 43), Rules Governing Applications for Operating Authority (served Dec. 24, 1980), established rules to bring the ICC

into compliance with both the procedural and substantive mandates of the Motor Carrier
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Act of 1980. Finally, Art Pape Transfer, Inc. - Ext. - Commodities in End Dump Vehicles, 132
I.C.C. 84 (1980), showed the Commission's intent to give applicants the broadest possible
authority by making grants as unspecific as possible. The Commission appeared to give Art
Pape wider authority, with respect both to commodity description and geographic limitations,
than had been requested. In Ex Parte No. 55 (Sub-No. 43A), Acceptable Forms of Requests
for Operating Authority (Motor Carriers and Brokers of Property) (served Dec. 24, 1980), the
ICC informed carriers to apply for broad, unrestricted authority, with geographic descriptions
encompassing at least an entire county and commodity requests defined in broad, generic
terms. Ex Parte No. MC-142, Elimination of Gateway Restrictions and Circuitous Route
Limitations (served Dec. 24, 1980), also implemented § 6 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980,
which mandated the elimination of these inefficiency-producing requirements. Ex Parte No.
MC-142 (Sub-No. 1), Removal of Restrictions From Authorities of Motor Carriers of Property
(served Dec. 24, 1980), also implemented § 6 of the Act by allowing carriers to petition the
ICC for permission to broaden the scope of existing geographic and commodity authority by
eliminating ICC imposed restrictions (other than gateway or circuitry) from their authority.
Cf. American Trucking Ass'n v. I.C.C., 659 F.2d 452, 456, 461-75 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding
that ICC attempts to implement §§ 5 and 6 exceeded its authority in many respects), docketed
No. 82-86, 51 U.S.L.W. 5014 (July 27, 1982).
As a result of these liberal policies, the ICC handled almost 87,000 applications during
fiscal 1980 and the first six months of fiscal year 1981, with 99.1% of all applications considered on their merits resulting in a full or partial grant of authority. In 1980, the Fin ancial
Accounting Standards Board ruled that the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 effectively negated the
intangible value of interstate operating authority. Approximately $774 million were written
off against motor carrier revenues due to this change. The accounting community, at least,
believes that present federal policy allows complete freedom of entry to all new or existing
carriers. Most other observers would agree. See Effect of Regulatory Reform, supra note 1, at
14-17, 27-29, 43-44 & 93-94.
3. The ICC has moved to minimize the role of rate bureaus in the rate setting process. Ex
Parte No. MC-297 (Sub-No. 4), Reopening of Section 5a Application Proceedings to Take
Additional Evidence (opened Dec. 30, 1977), required all non-rail rate bureaus to reapply
for antitrust immunity. Ex Parte No. MC-297 (Sub-No. 5), New Rules Governing Rate Bureaus
(served Dec. 30, 1980 and amended by order served May 11, 1981), implements § 14 of the Motor
Carrier Act of 1980 by encouraging independent rate actions and prohibiting rate bureaus
from initiating rate changes. Independent actions roughly doubled from 1979 to 1980, and
similar growth has continued. Carriers without authority to haul a shipment may not vote
on rates for that movement and, with a few exceptions, discussion of single line rates is
banned. These rules were substantially upheld in American Trucking Ass'n v. United States
& ICC, 688 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir. 1982). The Motor Carrier Ratemaking Study Commission will
report on collective ratemaking in 1983.
Ex Parte No. MC-128, Revenue Need Standards in Motor Carrier General Increase Proceedings (opened June 19, 1979), is attempting to formulate an equitable method for calculating carrier revenue need and to set appropriate standards. Section 11 of the Motor Carrier Act
of 1980 dramatically increased the ability of motor carriers to change rates. It establishes a
zone of rate freedom so that within set limits, rates may be changed up or down without the
possibility of ICC suspension for unreasonableness. See Effect of Regulatory Reform, supra
note 1, at 23-26, 74-83.
Lawfulness of Volume Discount Rates by a Motor Common Carrier of Property, 365 I.C.C.
711 (1982), denied a request by certain carriers for a proceeding to set standards governing
freight rate discounts for volume and aggregate tenders of freight. EX Parte No. MC-158, Rates
for a Named Shipper, Notice of Proposed Rules (served June 29, 1982), would eliminate the
general prohibition against common carrier publishing tariff rates and terms restricted to a
particular named shipper, receiver, or location. These two actions reflect the ICC's concern
that any interference or regulation from the agency would have a chilling effect on new
independent rate filings and might interfere with free market attempts by carriers to set
rates at competitive and profit maximizing levels.
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Commerce Commission (ICC) regulations that set up artificial distinctions to
lessen competition among carriers also have been largely eliminated. 4 Despite
some movement to revive these impediments to free competition,5 many of
the recent fundamental changes are irreversible for all practical purposes. 6
States traditionally have played an important role in intrastate motor
carrier regulation, although various state regulatory policies and procedures
often do not coincide with federal interstate transportation initiatives. 7 While
4. The ICC has begun moving to increase competition among the various categories of
carrier by allowing each category to compete for a broader range of freight. Terminal areas
were expanded, as were the areas of unregulated commercial zones surrounding most major
metropolitan areas, in Ex Parte No. MC-37 (Sub-No. 26), Commercial Zone Expansion (decided
Dec. 17, 1976). Toto Purchasing & Supply Co., Inc., 128 M.C.C. 873 (1978), allowed private
carriers to apply for authority to operate as common carriers if the operations were incidental
to their predominantly private operations. Ex Parte No. MC-55 (Sub-No. 42), Dual Operations
of Motor Carriers (served July 2, 1980), removed any ICC impediments to a carrier possessing
both common and contract authority, and Ex Parte MC-I19, Policy Statement Regarding the
"Rule of Eight" in Contract Carrier Operations (served Jan. 8, 1979), eliminated the rule
that a contract carrier could serve no more than eight shippers without jeopardizing its
status. Section 10 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793, codified at
49 U.S.C. § 10923(b) (Supp. IV 1980), eases the burden of obtaining contract carrier authority
by requiring the protestant to show that the grant would be "contrary to the public interest."
It also ratifies the ICC's repeal of both the "Rule of Eight" and restrictions against dual
operations. The Act removes impediments to agreements between contract carriers and freight
forwarders, and orders the ICC not to limit contract carrier grants of authority to particular
industries or geographical areas. Section 9 of the 1980 Act allows private carriers to receive
compensation for freight they haul for any wholly-owned corporate entity without being
regulated by the ICC. The ICC implemented this section in Ex Parte No. MC-122 (Sub-No. 1),
Implementation of Intercorporate Reform Legislation (served Dec. 24, 1980), which was upheld in American Trucking Ass'n v. ICC, 672 F.2d 850 (11th Cir. 1982). Proceedings are pending in Ex Parte No. MC-122 (Sub-No. 2), Lease of Equipment and Drivers to Private Carriers
(opened Dec. 19, 1980), which would allow private carriers greater freedom to deal with
owner-operators on a direct lease basis. For decisions stayed pending review, see Ryder Truck
Lines v. United States & ICC, No. 82-5247 (l1th Cir. 1982); Bowman Transp. Co. v. United
States & ICC, No. 82-8133 (11th Cir. Apr. 6, 1982). See Effect of Regulatory Reform, supra
note 1, at 20-23, 78-83. Finally, in Ex Parte No. MC-122 (Sub-No. 3), Interpretation -Intercorporate Hauling (served Dec. 24, 1980), the ICC found that an entity needing transportation
services could use an affiliated intercorporate hauler for the transportation of its own freight.
This interpretation did not allow for hire transportation of traffic tendered by a non-affiliated
corporation. See American Trucking Ass'n v. United States & ICC, No. 82-8060 (11th Cir.
filed Jan. 26, 1982).
5. See Re-Regulating at the ICC: The Congress Made Me Do It!, 5 REG. 5-10 (1981).
6. With thousands of new carriers being given authority each year and existing carriers
receiving much broader authority on a regular basis, the Commission appears to be approving
annually approximately 30,000 applications for new authority. Even if all new grants of
authority were stopped for the foreseeable future, the amount of authority already outstanding
is more than ever could be fully utilized. With hundreds of carriers already possessing 48 state
authorities, it would be impossible for the ICC even to consider the possibility of attempting
to allow a carrier to obtain a measure of market control over a particular route. Furthermore,
the growth of contract and private carriage operations also decreases the possibility that a
common carrier would maintain market control in the long run.
7. See inIra note 18. See Pub. L. No. 89-170, 79 Stat. 648 (1965), which amended the Interstate Commerce Act in an attempt to encourage greater uniformity among the states with
respect to motor carrier deregulation. Section 19 of the 1980 Act, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1983

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 3
1983]

MOTOR CARRIER REGULATION

the federal Motor Carrier Act of 1980 (1980 Act)," coupled with ICC deregulation efforts, has altered the federal presence in the motor carrier area, there
is no reason to expect states will change their procedures and laws to lockstep the federal scheme. Thus, the differences between state and federal motor
carrier economic regulation will likely expand. This divergence may hinder
realization of a nationally consistent and rational transportation policy.
The 1980 Act was designed to increase both competition and efficiency in
the transportation industry. 9 The 1980 Act increases competition by liberalizing
entry into the field.10 Moreover, the Act expands the areas of the trucking industry totally exempt from regulation." With respect to rate regulation, a new
zone of rate freedom allows motor carriers to set rates with less government
interference. In essence, carriers may adjust their rates ten percent above or
below existing rates.12 Thus, with eased entry and less restrictive rate regulation, proponents of the 1980 Act hoped for increased competition 3 and con4
comitant benefits for consumers.'
The 1980 Act recognized that a multiplicity of state regulatory requirements
would not promote a coherent national transportation policy.' 5 The legislature
simultaneously realized "that it is in the national interest to minimize the
burdens of such regulations while at the same time preserving the legitimate
interests of the States in such regulation... ,"16 Congress consequently directed
the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and the ICC to formulate
legislative or other recommendations for developing a more efficient and
equitable system of state motor carrier regulation."
Not surprisingly, a dispute developed concerning whether this congressional mandate limits the Secretary and the ICC to issues involving state
taxation, licensing, registration, safety procedures, and size and weight requirements, or whether recommendations also may be developed concerning state
economic regulation of intrastate carrier operating authority and rates.' 8 The
dispute raises issues over the right, as well as desirability, of federal inter793, also sets up a mechanism for studying and attempting to provide for a possible system of
uniform state regulation.
8. Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (codified in scattered sections of 49 US.C. §§ 10101-344
(Supp. IV. 1980)).
9. See Kretsinger, The Motor CarrierAct of 1980: Report and Analysis, 50 U.M.K.C. L.
REv. 23, 27 (1981).
10. See id. at 34-42.
11. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 10525 (Supp. IV 1980) (territorial exemptions); id. § 10526(a)(e) (6)
(agricultural exemptions).
12. Id. § 10708(1)(A)-(B).
13. S. REP. No. 96-641, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980).
14. For an extensive analysis of the 1980 Act, see Kretsinger, supra note 8.
15. See Pub. L. No. 96-296, § 19, 94 Stat. 811 (1980).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See U.S. DEP'T or TRANSP. & INTERSTATE COMMERCE Comm'N, Options for Uniform State
Regulation, Sec. 19, Motor CarrierAct of 1980, Working PaperNo. 1 51-58 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Working PaperNo. 1]; U.S. DEs'T or TRANSP. & INTERSTATE ComMERCE COMM'N, Uniform State Regulations, Economic Regulation of Interstate Commerce, Working Paper No. 5
1-3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Working PaperNo. 5].
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vention in an area traditionally under state control. 19 From a policy stand-

point, the dispute is important because the established trucking industry apparently endorses the view that federal intervention is not only undesirable
and unallowable, but that state regulation should continue in its present
form.2 0 This curious position favoring continued disparity between states
raises the specter of an industry using state legislation and regulatory commissions to subvert federal policy and limit competition. This outcome may or may
not be desirable, depending upon one's opinion of federal attempts to deregulate the industry.
Because state economic regulatory policies may hamstring federal policy
favoring increased competition, it is important to examine state regulatory
responses to the radical shift in federal motor carrier policy of the past five
years. Any possible impediments to the smooth functioning of an efficient
transportation system must be analyzed and examined. This article will discuss
the traditional state and federal approach to motor carrier economic regulation.
The focus will then shift to the responses from the contiguous states 21 to recent
22
changes in federal trucking policy.

TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC REGULATION

Intrastate economic regulation of the motor carrier industry has been re19. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444 n.18 (1978); South
Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85, 187 (1938). The
deference, however, is not absolute. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S.
662 (1981); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959). See also 49 U.S.C. § 1811
(1976) (nonpreemption of state laws concerning hazardous materials if equal or greater protection); id. § 11501 (Supp. IV 1981) (Staggers Rail Act of 1980, concerning intrastate railroad
ratemaking); Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, 96 Stat. 1102 (1982)
(Congress also apparently preempted state control over certain aspects of intrastate transportation).
20. See Working PaperNo. 1. supra note 18, at 57.
21. Alaska and Hawaii, for obvious geographical reasons, have transportation problems
wholly unrelated to the integrated transportation system that functions in and among the
remaining 48 states. As a convenience, most commentators exclude their problems from
consideration when discussing issues such as entry and rate regulation.
22. Issues concerning passenger carriers will not be discussed because their concerns are
different from those of most freight carriers. Rather than preferring state regulation, passenger
carriers typically object to it. See Working PaperNo. 1, supra note 18, at 55. The Bus Regulatory Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, 96 Stat. 1102 (1982), preempts state control over entry
and exit, id. § 6, and would require state regulatory commissions to conform to ICC policy
and procedures in deciding rate related issues. Id. § I. Issues concerning safety, taxation,
registration, and size and weight requirements are omitted because, while they may present
impediments to carriers if not uniform, they typically could not be used to thwart federal
regulatory policy. These requirements impact on all carriers equally, and, if anything, may
have a greater effect on large, established carriers that attempt to comply with the multiplicity
of regulations in 48 states. New, small carriers may have to comply with regulations in only
one or two states or may be more likely to ignore a burdensome regulation entirely. See
Working Paper No. 1, supra note 18, at 2-7, for an analysis of the myriad state licensing,
registration, and taxing regulations facing a carrier. For a more detailed analysis of the
problem, see U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. & INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMM'N, Uniform State Regulations, Working Paper Nos., 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 & 8 (Dec. 1981).
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markably consistent 23 despite differing approaches to taxation, licensing,
registration, safety, and other requirements. 24 Most jurisdictions follow the
pre-1980 federal practices of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935.25 States regulate
motor carriers through their Public Service or Public Utilities Commission
(PUG). 26 These commissions usually consist of an odd number of persons ap-

pointed by the Governor for a definite term. 27 Commissions maintain enforcement staffs to investigate complaints, such as alleged unauthorized operations
and tariff violations. 28 While some states utilize hearing examiners to handle
portions of the commission's caseload, most allow original proceedings before
the commissioners.To operate within a state, a common carrier"0 of goods and property is
32
generally3 l required to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity.
3
34
Contract carriers need a permit to operate. Private carriers are normally
23. For a summary of positions on economic regulations taken by major transportation
states and a comparison to federal regulation under the 1980 Act, see Working Paper No. 5,
supra note 18, app. B.
24.

See generally U.S. Dep't of Transp. & Interstate Commerce Comm'n, supra note 17.

State transportation practices typically are less formal than their federal counterparts, although
the states tend to place greater reliance on hearings than do the federal agencies, which
emphasize modified, no hearing procedures. Since the 1980 Act, the number of entry hearings
held by the ICC has approached zero, while the number of grants of authority to truckers has
multiplied dramatically, almost all of which are approved under the modified procedure
rules. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 1100A3-.52 (1982). States tend to place much less emphasis on the
formalities of pleadings and evidentiary rules. See, e.g., State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Carolina
Coach Co., 260 N.C. 43, 132 S.E.2d 249 (1963); State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Carolina Tel. &
Tel. Co., 267 N.C. 257, 148 S.E.2d 100 (1966). But they are much more likely to hold hearings
on all contested applications.
25. 49 U.S.C. §1 (1935).
26. The Commissions that have been, are, or will be responsible for motor carrier regulation in their respective states function under many names; for example, Virginia State
Corporation Commission, Texas Railroad Commission, New York Department of Transportation, Arizona Corporation Commission, Minnesota Transportation Regulatory Board, and
Washington Utilities & Transportation Commission.
27. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-10 (1977); WAsH. REv. CODE § 80.01.010 (1981).
28. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 62-14, -31, -34 & -277 (1977); WAsH. REv. CODE § 81.80.330

(1981).
29.

See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 62-14

(1977); WASH. REv. CODE § 80.01.050 (1981).

30. "'Motor common carrier' means a person holding itself out to the general public to
provide motor vehicle transportation for compensation over regular or irregular routes, or
both." 49 U.S.C. § 10.102(12) (Supp. IV 1980).
31. North Carolina exempts the following freight from economic regulation: (1) bulk
commodities, such as sand or gravel; (2) newspapers; (3) insecticides or fungicides; (4) farm
cooperatives; (5) livestock, fish and shellfish; (6) raw lumber products; (7) private carriers;
and (8) commodities of a character not hauled in the ordinary course of business by a common
carrier by motor vehicle. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-260(a)(9)-(14) & (16) (1977). Exempt commodities
tend to reflect regional concerns with Kentucky exempting coal, Oregon exempting potatoes,
etc. See also WASH. Rev. CODE § 81.80.040 (1981) (exempting farm products).
32. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-110 (1977); WAsH. REv. CODE § 1.80.070 (1981) (Washington calls its certificates "permits').
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-114 (1977) defines contract carrier as: "any person which, under
individual contracts or agreements, engages in the transportation, other than [common carrier]
transportation . ., by motor vehicle of property in intrastate commerce for compensation."
See also WASH. Rv. CODE § 81.80.070 (1981).
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exempt from state economic regulations, as are carriers operating solely within
a commercial zone or the boundaries of a city or municipality. 35 In an unusual
or emergency situation, a carrier may be granted permanent authority or some
form of temporary authority, 6 often on an ex parte basis, if no existing carrier
37
can meet the immediate need.
Certificates are granted to common carriers and are transferable to other
carriers if the proposed operations are required by "present or future public
convenience and necessity. ' ' 38 The applicant generally bears this burden of
proof.3° Permits are also granted to contract carriers if the grant would be
consistent with the public interest,40 usually a less burdensome standard than
public convenience and necessity. Hearings are held on protested applications, 41 with unopposed applications typically being voted upon pursuant to
staff recommendations.
34. N.C.

GEN. STAT.

42

§ 62-3(22) (1977) defines a private carrier as:

[A]ny person not included in definitions of common carrier or contract carrier, which
transports in intrastate commerce in its own vehicle or vehicles property of which such
person is the owner, lessee, or bailee, when such transportation is for the purpose of
sale, lease, rent, or bailment, or when such transportation is purely an incidental
adjunct to some other established private business owned and operated by such person
other than the transportation of property for compensation.
35. See id. § 62.260(e); N.C. UTIL. COMM'N R. 2-28 (1977). This exemption may be
relatively narrow, however, because most states, including North Carolina, do not exempt
private carriers if they haul goods for related corporate entities even if they are wholly owned
subsidiaries. This issue is referred to as "intercorporate hauling." See also WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 81.80.010(6) & .070. But see, e.g., Wvo. STAT. § 37-8-306 (1977), which requires private
carriers to obtain a permit before beginning operations.
36. Permanent authority refers to motor carrier operating authority vested in a carrier
pursuant to a certificate or permit. The authorization allows the carrier to operate subject
to delineated limitations until such time as a regulatory agency revokes the authority, typically
for willful violations of regulatory rules or laws. Temporary authority refers to operating
authority given to a carrier, for a limited period of time, when no existing service is available
to meet a particular need of the shipping public.
37. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-265 (1977); WASH. REv. CODE § 81.80.170 (1981); WASH.
ADMIN. CODE R. 480-12-033(5) (1981).
38. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-110 (1977); WASH. REy. CODE § 81.80.070 (1981). But see
VA. CODE § 56-281 (1950) in which no certificate may be issued unless existing service is found
inadequate and the carrier currently providing the service does not improve it within a reasonable time after the finding.
39. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 62-75 & -262(e) (1977) (commission must be convinced
public necessity requires proposed operation); WASH. Rav. CODE § 81-80.070 (1981) (same);
N.C. UTIL. COMM'N R. 2-15 (1977) (same).
40. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-262(i)(5) (1977); WASH. REV. CODE § 81.80.070 (1981);
N.C. UTIL. COMM'N R. 2-10 (1977).
41. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-262(d) (1977); N.C. UTIL. COMM'N R. 2-11 (1977); WASH.
ADNIN. CODE R. 480-12-045(3)(a) & (b) (1981).
42. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-262 (1977); WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 480-12-045(6) (1981).
The commission's decision is often influenced by factors such as the statements of shippers
regarding the need for new or additional motor carrier service; the adequacy of existing service
provided to those shippers by protesting carriers; the adequacy and training of the applicant's
personnel; the applicant's equipment and facilities; the applicant's compliance or good faith
attempts to comply with safety, licensing, insurance, and other regulatory requirements; and
whether the applicant is "fit, willing and able" to conduct its proposed operations. See, e.g.,
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Some commissions are concerned that new grants of authority may wastefully duplicate 43 or weaken the ability of existing carriers to- provide service
and that shippers support requests for new operating authority as a ploy because they have been promised lower freight rates if the new authority is
granted. This consideration is especially important in contract carriage applications, with some states requiring that contract carrier tariff rates be higher
than existing common carriage rates.- Most states also have general prohibitions against "dual operations,"4 5 which prevent a single carrier from
holding both common and contract carrier authority. Finally, most states
strongly enforce the "common carrier obligation"4" requiring a carrier with
appropriate authority to render service at a published rate to all shippers.
State commissions establish just and reasonable motor carrier rates, and
common carriers must publicly publish and file with the state tariffs setting
forth the terms and conditions of the transportation services they propose
to offer.47 Affected shippers must be given notice of proposed changes. 48
Generally, a tariff must be published for at least thirty days before it becomes
effective, although most states permit shorter notice periods under certain
conditions.4 9 The terms of the applicable tariff must be strictly adhered to
even if the result of a change would be a lower rate to the shipper.5 0
Most commissions may suspend proposed tariff changes and investigate
their justness and reasonableness. 5 An investigation ensues if a third party,
such as a shipper or another carrier, files a protest or complaint, or if the
commission files its own order. 2 Although a complaint or investigation may
N.C.

GEN. STAT. § 62-262(e) (1977); WAsH. REv. CODE § 81.80.070 (1981); N.C. UTM. CoMbl'N
R. 2-8, 14, 15 (1977).
43. N.C. Uns. CoMax'N R. 2-15(a) (1977). See, e.g., State ex rel. Util. Commrn v. Southern
Coach Co., 19 N.C. App. 597, 199 S.E.2d 731 (1973); State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Queen City
Coach Co., 4 N.C. App. 116, 166 S.E.2d 441 (1969). This does not mean, however, that carriers
are protected from all competition or from all adverse effects to their business. See State
ex -el. Util. Comm'n v. Ray, 236 N.C. 119, 63 S.E.2d 870 (1957); State ex rel. Util.
Comm'n v. Queen City Coach Co., 233 N.C. 692, 73 S.E.2d 113 (1951); State ex tel. Util.
Comm'n v. American Courier Corp., 8 N.C. App. 367, 174 S.E.2d 808 (1970); WAsH. REV. CODE

§ 81.80.020 8 .070 (1981).
44. See, e.g., N.C. UTI.

COMM'N

R. 2-16(b) (1977); WASH.

ADMIN. CODE

R. 480-12-255(6)

(1981).
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-264 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE § 81.80.260 (1981).
46. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-113 (1977); WAsH. REv. CODE § 81.80.220 (1981); N.C.
UTI. CoM'N R. 2-34 (1977). See also Hough-Wylie Co. v. Lucas, 236 N.C. 90, 72 S.EY2d 11
(1952).
47. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-130(a) (1977); N.C. UTL. COMM'N. R. 4-3(a) (1977);
WAsH. ADMIN.CODE R. 480-12-270 (1981). Contract carriers must also file copies of their agreements with the state Commission. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-142 (1977); WAsH. REv. CoDE
§ 81.80.140 (1981); N.C. UTIL. COM7,I'N. R. 2-16(b) & (c) (1977); WASH. ADMIN. CODE R.
45.

480-12-295(7) (1981).
48.
49.

See, e.g., N.C. U77m. COMM'N. R. 4-3(b) (1977).
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-134(a) (1977); WAsH.

REv. CODE § 81.80.150 & .28.050
UTis. COMM'N. R. 2-16(b) & (c) (1977).
50. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-201, -139 & -318 (1977); WAsH. REv. CODE § 81.80.220
(1981); N.C. UrL. COMM'N. R. 2-16 (1977).
51. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-134 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE § 81.80.150 (1981).

(1981); N.C.

52. See N.C. GEN. STAT.

&62-134

(1977); WASH. REv. CODE § 81.80.150 (1981).
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result from any rule, term, regulation, classification or condition contained in
the tariff,5 3 most disputes center on the rate levels charged pursuant to an
54
effective or proposed tariff.
Carriers in many states, through rate bureaus, propose collectively set
"general" increases or decreases on all or many commodities. 55 A single carrier
may propose a rate change for all or some of its freight, referred to as an
independent or individual action. Carriers operating collectively may also
propose rate changes for a limited number of commodities. Rates proposed
collectively or by rate bureaus, especially general increases, are more likely
to receive close commission scrutiny than independently proposed individual
increases, which usually are examined closely only if a protest is filed.56
The commission's staff reviews, often perfunctorily, all proposed rate
changes5 The staff would be unlikely to recommend a suspension of a rate
change that complies with the state's publishing format unless it is a major
general increase proposal or serious protests are registered~5 Because some
states review tariffs only if a protest is filed,5 9 most unprotested tariff changes
escape close scrutiny if properly published. A few states, however, have the
regulatory commission prescribe the rates all intrastate carriers charge. 60 Proposed changes may originate from either carriers or from commission studies
comparing existing rate levels with the costs of providing service. In states
using this procedure, carriers tend to be much more active than the commission's staff in proposing rate changes to the commission. There is little practical
difference between states opting for prescribed rates and states that review
rates for justness and reasonableness, especially in the general increase area
where all proposals are likely to be closely examined by the commission.
State commissions rely heavily on cost evidence developed by the carriers
or rate bureaus in ascertaining whether a rate is just, reasonable, fair and nondiscriminatory.6 1 Some states allow carriers to use anticipated costs, such as
53. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-146(e)
WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 480-12-295 (1981).

(1977); WASH. REV. CODE § 81.80.150

(1981);

54. Shippers often complain about rate increases while competing carriers claim rates
proposed by their competitors are unreasonably low. Complaints are occasionally voiced about
"long-haul, short-haul" violations, in which a carrier charges one shipper more for a shorter
haul than it charges another shipper for a longer haul of the same commodity over the same
route in the same direction. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-141 (1977); WASH. REv. CODE

§ 81.28.200 (1981).
55. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-152.1 (1977). A rate bureau is a cooperative undertaking
among a group of carriers. Although rate bureaus perform many functions, their most important role is collective establishment of rates by the member carriers. See infra note 69.
56. Given the manpower shortages indigenous to most state governments, regulatory
commissions typically adopted the prudent position of not spending the time to examine any
element of the tariff besides its format, unless it is protested.
57. California, with more than 10,000 carriers, has only 27 professional, administrative, and
clerical personnel who examine tariffs.
58. See Working Paper No. 5, supra note 18, at 9.
59. Id.
60. Id. See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-11-105 (1973); TEx. CODE ANN. art. 911b, § 4(a)
(Vernon 1982); WYo. STAT. § 37-8-107 (1977).
61. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-146(h) (1977) which states that the Commission should
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pending wage increases, for determining appropriate rates. 62 While large
carriers and rate bureaus can provide the requested data, it may be overly
63
burdensome for small carriers requesting individual rate increases to do SO.
Some states encourage small carriers' independent actions by allowing them
greater leeway to institute minor changes.The operating ratio, which sets anticipated or realized costs against expected
or actual revenues, is normally the most important measure of a proposed rate
change's justness and reasonableness.6 5 Most states compute the operating ratio
on a variable cost basis, which considers only out-of-pocket expenses necessary
to perform the service and ignores fixed costs. Other states consider variable
costs and fixed costs associated with plant, equipment, and other non-variable
expenses under the "fully allocated cost approach."6 If costs equal revenues,
the operating ratio is 100, a break-even position, while an operating ratio of
ninety or lower indicates a highly profitable operation. Most commissions
attempt to set rate levels whereby the "average" carrier has an operating ratio
of around ninety-five,67 a figure which may fluctuate with changing economic
conditions at the discretion of the commission. Some state commissions, however, have developed precise formulas for determining the justness and reasonableness of a rate.68 Carriers and rate bureaus in states with formulas therefore know in advance what will be an allowable rate increase.
69
Most states allow carriers to set rates collectively through rate bureaus.
give due consideration "to the need in the public interest of adequate and efficient transportation service . . at the lowest cost consistent with the furnishing of such service; and to the
need of revenues sufficient to enable such carriers under honest, economical, and efficient
management to provide such service," while id. § 62-14 6 (g) sets forth the operating ratio as an
important indicator of the consideration expressed in id. § 62-146(h). This financial justification may be documents or testimony of expert witnesses relating to carrier profitability, costs
of service, and traffic projections. See, e.g., N.C. UTIL. COMm'N R. 1-17 & 1-24(f) & (g) (1977).
North Carolina is somewhat unusual, however, in that it requires carriers to break their
revenues and expenses down into North Carolina and non-North Carolina categories, with
only North Carolina related expenses being considered by the Commission. Most states allow
carriers to use systemwide averages for determining operating ratios and other relevant financial
data.
62. The New York, North Carolina and Colorado public utilities commissions, for example,
allow evidence as to future costs in setting rates.
63. This problem apparently played a role in legislative decision to "sunset" the Florida
Public Service Commission's regulatory control over intrastate trucking. See Freeman, A
Survey of Motor CarrierDeregulationin Florida: One Year's Experience, 50 I.C.C. PRAcrrnoNER's J. 51, 54-55 (Nov./Dec. 1982).
64. See Working PaperNo. 5, supra note 18, at 38-39 &app. A (Kansas) &49 (New York).
65. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-146(g) (1977). For a more detailed analysis of motor
carrier costing policy and procedures, see Ex Parte No. MC-128, Revenue Need Standards in
Motor Carrier Increase Proceedings; Rules to Govern Assembling and Presenting Cost
Evidence, 337 I.C.C. 298 (1970).
66. See Working Paper No. 5, supra note 18, at 38-39 (Kansas) & 49 (New York) (these
states look at equity and return on invested capital).
67. The average operating ratio in New York is about 97, see Working Paper No. 5,
supra note 18, at 50, while Kansas allows carriers to be in the 90-93 range, id. at 40, and Iowa
recognizes 93.2 as a reasonable level, id. at 34.
68. See id. at 12 (Colorado).
69. For an explanation and analysis of the role of rate bureaus and collective ratemaking
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Many states have statutory provisions allowing for collective ratemaking,70
while other state commissions simply accept rate bureau filings.7 1 State involvement in this practice is required to give the collective rates, rate bureaus,
and carriers immunity from state and federal antitrust laws.7 2 A few states
now question the desirability of antitrust immunity for collective ratemaking
and have moved to restrict or eliminate the practice. 73
PosT-1980

STATE TRANSPORTATION

POLICY

A transportation lawyer reading the prior section would recognize how

traditional state economic regulation reflected pre-1980 ICC policy. The ICC,
however, is moving away from strict regulatory constraints imposed by a
centralized bureaucracy and toward greater reliance on competition as a restraint to unfair, discriminatory, and unreasonable rates and practices of motor
carriers.74 State responses to this dramatic policy change may play a major role
in determining its success. At a minimum, these responses will determine
whether economic regulation of motor carriage is consistent at the state and
federal levels or whether the industry must live under two philosophically
opposed systems.
The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC)
recognized that the policy changes in the 1980 Act necessitated changes in state
regulatory policy and adopted the Model State Motor Carrier Act (Model Act)
in 1980. 7T This Model Act was promulgated to "Promot[e] uniformity of regulation to the extent compatible with the state objective of protecting the consumer interest with respect. to intrastate transportation, and [to promote]
greater cooperation among the regulatory agencies . ...76 NARUC's proposal
closely follows the new regulatory direction taken by the ICC and the 1980 Act.
Although NARUC unanimously adopted the Model Act, there seems to
be little movement toward passage of similar legislation at the state level. 77
Perhaps the highly controversial shift in federal policy and the power of local
in the transportation process, see, e.g., Cross, Motor CarrierRate Territories and Bureaus,
1970 TRANsP. L. INST. PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 193-233 (1972); Marx, Group or Conference Rate-

Making and National TransportationPolicy in the United States, 24 LAw & CONTEM-P. PROBS.
588 (1959).
70. See United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf., 672 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1982),
which held that certain rate bureau activities were not exempt from the application of antitrust laws either under the "state action" exception or the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.
71. See GA. CODE § 46-7-18 (1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95V, § 18-512 (1980); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 62-152-1 (1977); TEx. CODE ANN. art. 911b, § 4a (Vernon 1982). But see Working
Paper No. 5, supra note 18, at app. A (Colorado, Massachusetts & Ohio).
72. See Working Paper No. 5, supra note 18, at app. A (Iowa &Washington).
73. See infra note 166 (California); notes 134-36 & 132-36 and accompanying text (West
Virginia); infra text accompanying notes 123-31 (New York). See also United States v. Southern
Motor Carriers Rate Conf., 672 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1982).
74. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
75. See Convention Resolution No. 10, reported in, NARUC Bulletin No. 2-1981, at 5.
See also NARUC Bulletin No. 43-1980.
76. See Convention Resolution No. 10, reported in, NARUC Bulletin No. 2-1981, at 5.
77. New Mexico has effectively adopted the NARUC Model Motor Carrier Act. See
infra notes 117-28 and accompanying text,
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trucking and union interests are factors. More likely reasons, however, are
that there is no great outpouring of sentiment at the state level for change and
that many state commissions view the federal policy as an unproven experiment. 8 State legislators and regulators are particularly concerned with the
effect that deregulation would have on the common carrier obligation and the
service received by small or isolated communities or businesses.-9 The shift
in federal policy had been under consideration for years, and there certainly
is no reason to expect that the states would, or should, abruptly change their
policies so soon after enactment of new sweeping federal initiatives. As the
effects of loosened regulation or deregulation become clearer, states may well
rally behind the federal policy and place greater emphasis on competition and
less on regulation.
Even if states have not docilely fallen into line behind federal policy, most
have made at least minor changes in motor carrier regulation reflecting the
new federal realities. The remainder of this article will delineate present and
prospective state regulatory schemes in the aftermath of the 1980 federal policy
shift.
States Continuing TraditionalRegulatory Policy
Thirty-five states continue motor carrier economic regulation similar to
pre-1980 ICC policy. 0 In five of these states, Colorado, Louisiana, Michigan,
Nevada, and Washington, some loosening appears possibles1 In Colorado,
while there is no move toward entry reform, the Commission apparently allows
greater rate flexibility and is moving away from prescribed, uniform rates.8 2 A
78. See infra note 81. See also N.Y. State Assembly Bill 7920-B, § 1 (1981) (further deregulation may be appropriate after the affects of motor carrier regulatory reform legislation
in other jurisdictions is analyzed).
79. See N.Y. State Assembly Bill 7920-B, § 1 (1981).
80. The following states have not made meaningful changes in their laws or policies
recently: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Vermont and Washington.
81. Given the looseness of state administrative practice and the dearth of written opinions
from many jurisdictions, one of the only ways to gauge the legislative and regulatory trends
is to survey those persons most closely attuned to the policies of each jurisdiction. Thus, in
each of the forty-eight states, one or more representatives of the state regulatory agency and
one or more representatives of the principal motor carrier trade and lobbying group, typically
an affiliate of the American Trucking Ass'n, Inc., were questioned by the authors about state
transportation policy and trends. Transportation lawyers in many states also were interviewed. The perceptions of these parties are reported in this paper, as noted. Differences of
opinion which arose among those interviewed are also noted.
82. Id. Pursuant to C.R.S. § 40-11-105 and Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 158 Colo. 239, 406 P.2d 83 (1965), the Colorado Commission is required to prescribe rates on certain types of common and contract carriers. The Commission met this
mandate in Decision No. C82-492, Case No. 1585, Order of Commission Prescribing Rates
(entered Feb. 5, 1936, amended Mar. 30, 1982), but apparently now is concerned about prescribed, uniform rates only for general commodities carriers.
It must be stressed that Colorado does not have a very loose entry policy, because
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bill that would deregulate common carriers is under consideration in Louisiana. s3 With the help of the established trucking industry, Michigan is in the
process of drafting legislation allowing a zone of rate freedom and making
collective ratemaking mandatory when two or more carriers are involved.,
The new entry standard would be the same "useful public purpose" test
contained in the 1980 Act. 85 Nevada's Public Service Commission has begun
holding that competition per se, without any additional evidence of public
necessity, is justification for granting new operating authority; and their legislature is holding hearings on proposals to deregulate trucking.86 Washington
initiated a three year deregulation study in 1981, and the legislative and the
non-legislative advisory committees examining the issue will likely recommend
8 7
at least some liberalization of entry requirements.
There appears to be no present support for deregulation in the remaining
twenty-nine states continuing traditional ICC economic regulation, although
changes consistent with the 1980 Act have been introduced or adopted in some
states. Alabama appears to have shifted the burden of proof to the protestant in
challenged entry proceedings. 88 Georgia now allows automatic grants of authority in uncontested cases89 and joins Texas in requiring greater commission
restrictions on and participation in the activities of intrastate rate bureaus. 90
92
91
Indiana is planning a sunset review of its commission in 1987. In Iowa
and Missouri 93 the Attorney General is attacking intrastate rate bureaus. In
Massachusetts, which does not grant collective ratemaking immunity to its
diversion of traffic from existing carriers continues to be grounds for a denial in protested
entry cases. The burden of proof remains on the applicants. See supra note 81. Despite the
softening of the policy concerning uniform, prescribed rates, the Commission continues to
require that irregular route common carriers charge rates higher than regular route common
carriers, and that contract carriers charge rates equal to or higher than those of competing
common carriers performing substantially the same service. See Decision No. C82-492, supra.
If a contract carrier is not competing with a common carrier and the rendered service is not
similar or substantially the same as a common carrier, the minimum rate restrictions do not

apply. See Denver-Climax Truck Line v. Jim Chelf, Inc., 167 Colo. 69, 445 P.2d 399 (1968).
83.

See supra note 81.

84. See Mich. H.R. 5669, art. II, § 7A & art. V, § 6B.
85. Id. art. II, § 5.
86. See supra note 81. But see Whittlesea-Bell Luxury Limosine v. P.V.C., No. A216412
(8th Jud. Dist. Ct. Nev., Clark County, Nov. 2, 1982) (enjoined enforcement of competition

per see policy in this proceeding only).
87. See supra note 81.

88. Id.
89. Current Georgia Public Service Commission practice in uncontested cases is to inform
the applicant that his appearance is not necessary. See supra note 81.
90. See Ga. S. 453 (Reg. Sess. 1980) (amending GA. CODE § 68-510 (1931) and the Ga.

Motor Carrier Act of 1931). This change was necessary to bring Georgia law into conformance
with United States v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf., 672 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1982), so
that intrastate rate bureaus could have antitrust immunity. See also TEx. CODE ANN. art. 91lb,
§ 4a (Vernon 1982).
91.

See supra note 81.

92. In Iowa, the Attorney General has not yet brought suit against the Iowa movers
bureaus, but is presently considering the possibility. Id.

93. See Missouri v. Green & Mo. Movers Ass'n, Inc., No. 79-862 (Mo. 19th Cir. Ct. Oct.
19, 1979).
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carriers, the United States Department of Justice is bringing suit against the
uniform rates imposed by intrastate furniture movers.9 4 No formal reform
actions have been taken in Minnesota, but on January 1, 1983, a new Transportation Regulatory Board 5 replaced the present Commission, which may
presage greater state emphasis on transportation policy. In Mississippi, deregulation efforts have never gotten out of committee, while in Montana
current sunset review anticipates no substantive changes. 6
Although New Hampshire's Commission emerged unscathed from 1981
7
sunset review, deregulation bills are expected to be introduced in 1983.1
Similarly, South Carolina's Commission should survive sunset review in 198.8 s
North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee eased entry restrictions, and both Carolinas have new procedures allowing unopposed entry
applications to be approved without a hearing.99 Pennsylvania may institute
zone of rate flexibility during 1983.100 Ohio has loosened its entry policy and in
practice may have shifted the burden of proof to the protestant in opposed
entry proceedings.' 0 ' Oregon deregulated several transportation categories in
102
1981, but more comprehensive deregulation efforts have subsequently failed.
A push by major shipping interests prompted the Texas legislature to authorize
a deregulation study by its Committee on Transportation,0 3 but the only action
taken has been a 1983 sunset review that may result in some relaxation. A state
study in Utah adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward deregulation.104
In roughly two-thirds of the states, therefore, traditional economic regulation of the motor carrier industry continues virtually unchanged. The remaining fourteen states 05 have undertaken major efforts to revamp trucking regulation policies.
States Moving into Conformity with
the 1980 Act
Eight states are presently moving toward the ICC's post-1980 regulatory
94. See FTC v. Massachusetts Furniture & Piano Movers Ass'n, Inc., FTC Docket No.
9137 (Dec. 1, 1981).
95. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 174A.01 (1981).
96. See supra note 81.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-262(d) (1981). South Carolina has not passed any specific
statute, but administratively allows unopposed applications to be approved without a hearing.
100. See supra note 81.

101. Id. Some transportation lawyers feel, however, that entry policy in opposed proceedings has not appreciably loosened.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Letter from Max W. Young, head of Transportation Task Force to Review Regulation of the Intrastate Motor Carrier Industry, to Gov. Scott M. Matheson (Jan. 2, 1982)
("no action required"); Minutes of Transportation & Public Safety Study Commission (Oct. 20,
1982) (recommendations regarding regulatory changes or deregulation postponed for one year
pending observation of Arizona and Florida experiences).
105. These states are: Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, South Dakota, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
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approach. Idaho deregulated its household goods carriers in 1981 and may yet
attempt to deregulate the entire intrastate motor carrier industry in 1983.106
Entry has always been easy and is getting easier for carriers. The Idaho Commission also no longer strives for rate uniformity among carriers.107 The Commission has started approving maximum rather than exact rates for some
carriers, especially those hauling truckload quantities.110
Kansas appears to be following the 1980 Act respecting entry and rate
bureaus. The primary criterion for entry is merely whether the applicant is
"fit, willing, and able,"109 which dramatically limits the possibility of protests.
Rate regulation will continue, especially for contract carriers who may not
charge less than existing common carrier rates. After 1982, rate bureaus may
not be used to agree on single line rates, while ratemaking procedures have
been established for joint line ratemaking. 110
Recent changes in New Mexico, which were based on the Model Act,
authorize the issuance of certificates of public convenience and necessity to
common carriers if they are "fit, willing, and able" and would "serve a useful
public purpose, responsive to a public demand or need.""' Only certain
carriers may protest applications,112 and in order to block an application the
protestants must prove the proposed service inconsistent with public convenience and necessity. x3 The Commission must consider the effect of granting
the certificate on existing carriers, although traffic or revenue diversion alone
is not inconsistent with public convenience and necessity."1 Gateway restrictions and circuitous route limitations are to be eliminated and regulations
are to be implemented to streamline the removal of other operating rights
restrictions. 115 Liberalized contract carriage standards do not fix the maximum
number of shippers a carrier may serve and mandate the issuance of a permit
if the carrier is "fit, willing, and able" and the proposed operation is consistent
with the public interest.1" 6 Dual operations also are allowed.", The New
Mexico statute permits rate bureaus and collective ratemaking, but bestows
antitrust immunity only on carriers with ratemaking agreements approved by
the Commission." 8 The right of independent action must be preserved, and
106. See IDAHO CoDe § 61-801(K)(12) (1981).
107. See supra note 81.
108. Id.
109.
See Kan. S. 511 § 3 (1982) (amending KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-1, 114 (1981). Although
the primary standard is "fit, willing and able," a protested application could be denied if
evidence showed the application was inconsistent with public convenience and necessity. Id.
110. See id. § 1.
111. Motor Carrier Act, 1981 N.M. Laws, ch. 358, § 5D(1) (to be codified at N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 65-2-84(D)(1)).
112. Id. § 6E & F (to be codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-2-85(E) & (1)). See also supra
text accompanying notes 75-76.
113. Id. § 5E (to be codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-2-84(E)).
114. Id. § 5F (to be codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-2-84(F)).
115. Motor Carrier Act, 1981 N.M. Laws, ch. 358, § 7 (to be codified at N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 65-2-86).
116. Id. §§ 7 g: 8 (to be codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-2-87 to -88).
117. Id. § 1C (to be codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-2-89(C)).
118. Id. § 19 (to be codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-2-98).
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after 1983 joint discussion on actions concerning single-line rates will not be
119
Unreasonable preferences for or against any person,
allowed in most cases.
port, gateway, locality or region, district, territory, or description of traffic are
unacceptable. 20 Finally, the Commission must establish a zone of rate freedom
2
initially no greater than ten percent above or below a specified level.' ' The
range of the zone may not be expanded by more than five percent in each
direction per year.2 2 In practically all respects, New Mexico follows NARUC's
Model Act by putting emphasis on independent action and greater reliance on
unregulated competition as a deterrent to unfair and unreasonable motor
carrier practices.
New York continues to regulate in the traditional pre-1980 ICC manner,
1 23
but is considering legislation to simplify its transportation law.' An original
bill advanced by state transportation officials met with motor carrier objections; 24 however, a substitute bill has been endorsed by state officials and the
industry. The proposed legislation would bring service and rate bureau require25
ments in line with the 1980 Act' and would shorten the period of time within
which the Department of Transportation may withhold decision on a proposed
rate increase. 26 The bill allows a ten percent zone of rate freedom for non29
28
and distougher protest standards,
collectively set rates,' 27 eased entry,
30
This
cretionary hearings in certificate or permit application proceedings.
to stimulate competition
proposed legislation to allow greater rate freedom and
3
is likely to pass during the next legislative session.' '
While regulating tariff rates in the traditional manner, South Dakota has
32
shifted the burden of proof in entry cases to the protestants. Traffic or revenue
diversion from existing carriers may not be the sole reason for denying a permit,
and the Commission will issue a certificate unless the protestants prove that
33
Since South
the grant would contravene public convenience and necessity.
certificate
in
prevailed
have
protestants
no
1981,
in
effect
took
Dakota's new law
proceedings.
issuance
119. Id. § 19B(2)(b) & (4) (to be codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-2-98(B)(2)(b) & (4)).
120. Id. § 17D (to be codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-2-96(D)).
121. Id. § 171 (to be codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-2-96(I)).
122. Id.
123. See Governor's Program Bill No. 164 (1981) (prepared primarily by the New York
State Dep't of Transp.). See also N.Y. Assembly Bill 7920-B (1981) (another bill designed to
meet concerns voiced by the transportation industry).
124. The Governor's Program Bill No. 164 (1981) was criticized because it abolished many
elements of existing law that protected carriers without removing enough of the restrictions
imposed on truckers.
125. See N.Y. Assembly Bill 7920-B, § 142 (1981).
126. Id. § 179(5).
127. Id. § 178(8).
128. Id. §§ 174-75 & 193.

129. Id. §§ 174(3), 175 & 193(7).
130. Id. §§ 174-75 & 193.
131. See Memorandum on Governor's Program Bill No. 164, at 2-3 (1981). See supra note
81.
132. See S.D. H.R. 1129, § 5 (Reg. Sess. 1981) (amending S.D. ConrEm LAws § 49-28-14
(1974)).
133. Id.
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Because West Virginia now assumes competition to be in the public
interest, its PUC has eased applicant entry requirements. 13 4 The PUC agrees
with deregulation proposals whenever possible and has announced a two-year
experimental prohibition of collective ratemaking. 1 35 At the experiment's
mid-point, it is unclear whether the moratorium will be lifted at the end of the
second year. Nevertheless, the trucking industry is concerned enough about
the changes to propose its own deregulation bill,13 which has not yet been
acted upon.
Wisconsin and Wyoming have practically unlimited entry derived from
two entirely different mechanisms. Wisconsin traditionally had lax entry requirements. 37 This negligible entry regulation prompted carriers to support
a bill making fitness the only criterion for a grant of authority.138 Because the
filing fee increased from $50.00 to $500.00,139 the bill may be more accurately
characterized as a revenue bill than an attempt at economic reregulation of
the motor carrier industry. Thus, for all practical purposes, traditional entry
regulation has ended in Wisconsin. Wyoming, which sets rates for some common
carriers and allows contract carriers to charge no less than these established
rates, 4 0 grants permits to contract carriers as a matter of right.' 4 ' Because
nothing requires contract carriers to identify the companies for which they
wish to transport goods, most carriers, even household goods carriers, run in
14 2
Wyoming pursuant to the automatically granted contract carrier authority,
thus avoiding totally Wyoming's public convenience and necessity test for
common cariiers.
California'sMajor Reregulation Effort
Motor carrier and public concern has led to a major reregulation effort in
California. The established trucking community backs much of this effort on the
theory that if traditional regulatory concepts are discontinued, the best alternative is the least amount of state intrusion in the motor carrier industry.143 In
1975, the California PUG began a substantial relaxation of governmental
trucking controls, while retaining an oversight role in the affairs of carriers.'Entry controls have largely disappeared, as have the public convenience and
necessity standard and the "no harmful effect on existing carriers" standard. 14 5
134. See Public Serv. Comm'n of W. Va. Motor Carrier, Case Nos. 20376 & 20377, at 6
(Oct. 26, 1981).
135. Id.
136. See supra note 81.
137. Id. Approximately 97% of all entrants have been accepted since 1980. Id.
138. See Motor Carriers - Deregulation, 1981 Wis. Legis. Serv., ch. 347, § 51 (West) (to be
codified at Wis. STAT. § 194.23).
139. Id.
140. See Wyo. STAT. § 37-8-108 (1977).
141. See id. § 37-8-304.
142. See supra note 81.
143. Id.
144. See CALIFORNIA PUB. UTI,. COMM'N, TRANSP. DIVISION, Report to the Legislature on
Trucking Re-Regulation, at 7-8 (Mar. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Report to the Legislature].
145. See generally Cal. S. 860 (Reg. Sess. 1977) (effective Apr. 30, 1980). See also Report
to the Legislature, supra note 144l, at 8.
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Greater policy emphasis, however, has been placed on proving financial fitness
or responsibility as a precondition to operating in California. 46 Concluding
that setting minimum rates is not an appropriate state function, the Commission
has begun canceling statewide minimum rate orders-' 7 and allowing carriers
to exercise considerable freedom over tariff rates.148 The PUG still exercises
oversight review in the pricing area, although no comprehensive tariff examination program is in place.149 Thus, the state continues to play a role, albeit a
much more limited one, in the motor carrier area.
The road to reregulation has not been smooth. For example, in 1975 the
PUG considered canceling all state-approved minimum rates and requiring
all carriers to file new tariffs within 150 days.150 When it became apparent
that the time frame had been overly ambitious, the PUG announced it would
consider regulatory changes in eighteen different minimum rate tariffs3.5 By
1981, the Commission, managed to cancel minimum rate tariffs on general
commodities, trailer coaches, and tank or vacuum truck carriers, 52 but the
cancellation of other tariffs was still under consideration.
Even the relatively straightforward goal of requiring carriers to set rates
on an individual basis has been difficult to implement. 58 When the general
commodities minimum tariff was canceled in 1980, carriers were required to
set their own rates and file tariff schedules with the PUC.54 To ease the burden
on carriers, the Commission allowed carriers to adopt former minimum rate
tariffs called "transition tariffs,"'15 which could be relied on for some period of
time to be determined by the PUG. 158 This "transition" program still continues.'57
A 1981 California Supreme Court decision, United States Steel Corp. v.
P.U.C.," s slowed reregulation by mandating that the Commission exercise
increased caution when considering the economic consequences of reregulation.159 The carriers' lack of experience in developing and filing individual
tariffs led to numerous mistakes. Education of the carriers 60 and the multitude
146. See supra note 81. Many feel, however, that the practical effects of this policy have
been nil.
147.

See Report to the Legislature, supra note 144, at 7.

148. Statewide tariffs covering general commodities carriers, cement, and trailer coaches
have been cancelled. Id. at 11, table 1.
149. See id. at 7-8.

150. See California Pub. Util. Comm'n, Case no. 9963 (Sept. 3, 1975). See also Report to
the Legislature, supra note 144, at 9.

151. California Pub. Util. Comm'n, Case No. 87047 (Mar. 9, 1977).
Legislature, supra note 144, at 9 & app. A.
152. See Report to the Legislature,supra note 144, at 9-12.
153. Id. at 10-12.
154. id. at 9.
155. See Working Paper No. 5, supra note 18, at 3-4, app. A.
156. Id.

See also Report to the

157. See California Pub. Util. Comm'n, Case No. 90663 (Aug. 1979, effective Apr. 1, 1980).
See also Order Instituting Rulemaking No. 4 (Nov. 13, 1982), which established policy and

rules for the transition program.
158. 29 Cal. 3d 603, 629 P.2d 1381, 175 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1981).
159. Id. at 609-10, 629 P.2d at 1384-85, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 172-73.
160. See Report to the Legislature, supra note 144, at 13.
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of individual tariffs filed has greatly inflated PUG administrative costs, com16
pared to the regulatory costs associated with uniform statewide tariffs. ' An-

other bottleneck has been the unavailability of adequate cost data and the
consequent delays in completing studies needed to determine the lawfulness
of rate changes and practices. 162 This lack of cost data is a particularly severe
impediment to rate reductions because carriers using transition tariffs may
republish rates below that level only if they demonstrate the new rates are
needed to meet competition or to contribute to carrier profitability.16 3 Until
better data are available, the PUC is requiring carriers to use prevailing union
wage scales in their calculations to demonstrate that a lower rate is lawful. Non64
union carriers find this a most difficult burden to meet.
To simplify the filing procedure for rate increases or decreases, the Commission probably will phase in a "rate window," similar to the federal scheme's
zone of rate freedom, which would allow gradual increases to the zone in
which carriers can freely change rates from the prior year's levels. 16 5 This zone
would expand until a phased-in deregulation of motor carrier rates occurred. 66
Carriers then would be in complete control of their economic position. In the
meantime, California carriers find rate changes burdensome without a
simplified procedure as evidenced by the modest number of proposed rate re6
ductions or deviations from transition levels filed with the PUG.' '

Because reregulation in non-entry areas has been almost entirely administrative, rather than legislative, it has led to a plethora of problems and delays.
The PUG continues to gTapple with problems such as the role of rate
bureaus, 168 an expedited method for rate increases and reductions,6 9 state
policy on compensated intercorporate hauling," ° and a system for handling
overcharge claims.' 71 The absence of a clear PUG policy on these important
issues often completely stymies new carrier initiatives. For example, the PUG
161. The number of pages of tariffs filed with the Commission has gone from 36,866 in
fiscal year 1978-79 to 95,000 in fiscal year 1981-82. The number of contracts filed with the
Commission has gone from zero in fiscal year 1978-79 to 12,000 in fiscal year 1981-82. Id. at
app. G.
162.

See Report to the Legislature,supra note 144, at 16-17.

163. See Working Paper No. 5, supra note 18, at 4, app. A.
164. Id.
165. See Order Instituting Rulemaking No. 6 (May 5, 1981). See also Report to the
Legislature, supra note 144, at 19-20.
166. See Report to the Legislature, supra note 144, at 19-21.
167. The number of rate reductions processed by the Commission in fiscal year 1981-82
was 650. Id. at app. F.
168. See Order Instituting Investigation, Case 10368 (July 6, 1977) (pending) (to determine the fate of California rate bureaus with respect to antitrust immunity).
169. Order Instituting Rulemaking No. 6 (May 5, 1981) (in which the Commission is
considering adoption of a "rate window" or "zone of rate freedom," to enhance carrier rate
flexibility).
170. See Order Instituting Rulemaking No. 3 (Sept. 22, 1982) (Commission established
rules and policy allowing compensated intercorporate hauling for 100% owned subsidiaries
without regulatory constraints).
171. See Order Instituting Rulemaking 5 and Decision 82-02-127 (Apr. 18, 1982), Rules
Governing the Processing, Investigation, and Disposition of Overcharge on Duplicative Payment Claims by Common Carriers.
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continues to offer antitrust immunity for approved rate bureau agreements,
while simultaneously investigating the legality of the practices, rules, and
activities of all rate bureaus.1 7 2 This incongruity between formal policy and
actual practice, coupled with Commission warnings of uncertainty about federal
antitrust immunity for collective ratemaking agreements, leaves the bureaus
operating under a cloud.173
California therefore remains in the throes of an administratively wrought
no-man's land. The PUCs direction is clear, but its path remains uncertain.
Carriers are pushing for rate deregulation to complement eased entry requirements; and the Commission is trying to move toward reliance on free and open
motor carrier competition. The agency, however, apparently does not have
enough trust in competition to recommend total removal of its oversight role
in the surface transportation area. California is traversing new ground by
undertaking this difficult task of realigning traditional regulatory trade-offs
such as limited entry and rate control. In this uncharted land, it is not surprising that obstacles have impeded the PUC's attempts to formulate a fair
transportation policy based upon regulatory trade-offs more closely aligned to
the free competition model.
The Deregulationists:States with
Total Deregulation
Five states - New Jersey, Delaware, Arizona, Maine and Florida - are
totally deregulated. The first two states, New Jersey and Delaware, never have
had any meaningful economic regulation. 7 4 Because of this lack of traditional
regulation, shippers and carriers in these two states may not be able to draw
comparisons between the advantages of regulation and deregulation. Studies
to date, however, do demonstrate that service failures and rate problems have
not been serious and that the transportation industry functions more
efficiently absent state control1 75
The remaining three states - Arizona, Maine and Florida - abandoned
their traditional regulatory schemes for total deregulation. In 1982, Arizona
acted by referendum176 and Maine deregulated legislaively177 Their deregulation experiences are too recent to evaluate, although indications are that
shippers consider deregulation beneficial and that service to small communi8
ties and businesses will not sufferJ7
172.
173.

See Order Reinstituting Investigation, Case 10368 (July 6, 1977).
Id.

174. New Jersey, however, does exercise some economic jurisdiction over household
goods and solid waste disposal and some entry controls over bulk carriers, for purposes of
safety.
175. See generally, Testimony of Professors Alice Kidder and Bruce Allen, before the
Motor Carrier Ratemaking Study Comm'n, Orlando, Florida (Apr. 1, 1982) (to be published
in Report of Motor CarrierRatemaking Study Commission (U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1983)).
176. Proposition 101, which deregulated Arizona's motor carrier industry, was passed on
November 4, 1980.
177. See Me. H.R. 1576 (Reg. Sess. 1981) (effective Jan. 1, 1982).
178. Freeman & Beilock, An Analysis of Arizona and FloridaMotor CarrierDeregulation
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Florida is an ideal laboratory for examining the impact of total motor
carrier deregulation, because it is the one state experiencing both regulation and
deregulation for a considerable period of time. Florida's regulatory controls
were suddenly sunsetted out of existence on July 1, 1980.179 Many legislators
felt the Florida Public Service Commission was too restrictive, 8 0 while carriers
labeled it slow, cumbersome, and ineffective.181 Florida's two legislative houses
passed bills to reregulate trucking, 18 2 but no agreement could be reached prior
to the expiration of Commission authority over intrastate trucking.8 3 Because large volumes of commercial, industrial, and agricultural freight move
throughout the elongated state, Florida's deregulation experience will offer
valuable insights into the desirability of similar deregulation in other jurisdirtions.
While final results will not be known for several more years, preliminary
research suggests the transition to deregulation has been smooth and orderly.',
Freight shippers overwhelmingly favor deregulation because it has dampened
rate increases and improved service,1s5 while the motor carrier community is
just as happy with deregulation as it was with Commission regulation.18 6 Only
about ten percent of shippers and private carriers prefer regulation over deregulation, and approximately half of the carriers approve of deregulation.18 7
Household goods movers are more likely to support deregulation than are
other carriers. 88
Most carriers believe competition has increased since deregulation, 8 9 but
and the Implications for State Regulatory Change, 15TH ANNUAL TRANSP. L. INsT. (1983)
(Butterworth Legal Pub'l. Seattle, Washington).
179. See generally Freeman, supra note 63, at 51, 55; Report to the Committee on
Governmental Operations of the Florida House of Representatives, 1980 LEGISLATIVE ACTION
ON MOTOR CARRIER REGULATION (Mar. 1, 1981); Symposium, Trucking Deregulation, 32 U.
FLA. L. REV. 843-954 (1980).
180. See Freeman, supra note 63, at 54.
181. Id. at 55.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See ICC OFFICE OF POLICY & ANALYSIS, Commission Studies of FloridaMotor Carrier
Deregulation: An Interim Report (Apr. 1981); ICC OFFICE OF POLICY & ANALYSIS, Initial
Carrier and Shipper Responses to Intrastate Trucking Deregulation in Florida (June 1981);
Freeman, supra note 63, at 67-68; Freeman & Beilock, Motor CarrierDeregulation in Florida:
Shipper/Receiver and Carrier Perspectives, __ GROWTH & CHANGE __ (1983).
185. Seventy-one percent of shippers responding to a survey believed that rates were
held down by deregulation in Florida. See Freeman, supra note 63, at 61.
186. Id. at 60-61.
187. Id. at 58.
188. Id. One explanation for this finding is that household goods carriers have been
able to increase rates in the fact of deregulation, something that has been denied other
truckers due to competitive constraints. Because many household goods moves are paid for
by third-parties (employers) and because certainty and assurance of a successful move are
paramount to the moving party, it is unlikely that many people will trust their household
possessions to someone with whom they are not familiar. Thus, well-known national
companies tend to get the business regardless of cost. Under deregulation, and absent state
scrutiny, these companies have been able to impose rate increases and make them stick.
Apparently the movement of one's personal possessions is not a price-elastic commodity.
189. Only 11% of the carriers believe that competition has not increased. Id. at 62-63.
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fewer than half of the carriers perceive deregulation as responsible for reduced
profits. 90 Service has improved, with over one hundred new carriers offering
service in Florida since 1980.191 About thirty-five percent of the private carriers
are now hauling at least some freight for other companies, a practice normally
not possible in a regulated environment. 192 Established Florida carriers also
have expanded existing operations and interstate truckers have begun offering
intrastate service.29 3 Because interstate carriers now compete for local business
and intrastate carriers cannot retaliate by bidding for the competitor's interstate traffic, 9"4 Florida intrastate carriers are at a competitive disadvantage so
long as regulation continues in surrounding states and at the federal level.
Thus, support among intrastate carriers for deregulation in Florida might even
be greater if the entire country were deregulated.
Rate levels have generally dropped in real terms, except on very small or
low-rated shipments. 95 Carriers are restructuring their rates to reflect actual
costs more closely. 95 Shippers with large or multiple shipments often can
make attractive deals with discounts of up to sixty percent from the 1980
regulated tariff rates. 97 Household goods movers, however, have been conspicuous in raising their rates under deregulation 9 Despite these generally

190. Forty-nine percent of the carriers perceive at least some negative effect on profitability, roughly correlating with those carriers opposed to deregulation. Id. at 63.
191. Chi, Intrastate Motor CarrierDeregulation: The Florida Experience, INNOVATIONS
4 (Jan. 1982). Sixty-one percent of the surveyed carriers report increased competition from
new carriers. See Freeman, supra note 63.
192. See Freeman, supra note 63, at 66.
193. Fifty percent of all responding carriers noted increased competition from established Florida carriers, and 50% also believed that established non-Florida carriers were
beginning to compete for freight. Id. at 63.
194. In effect, anyone with a truck-a new carrier, an authorized interstate carrier, or
an authorized intrastate carrier from Georgia or Alabama, for instance- can now solicit and
haul Florida intrastate freight, thus taking business away from existing intrastate carriers
in Florida. These same Florida carriers, however, cannot retaliate against out-of-state carriers
by soliciting their business without first obtaining authority from the appropriate state or
federal agency, a long and expensive process in most states and still a time consuming process
at the federal level.
195. See supra note 185. Low-rated shipments refers to shipped commodities which
tend to be heavy for their volume and of low market value for their weight.
196. Fifty-one percent of the surveyed carriers now are basing their tariff rates on the
cost of providing that particular transportation rather than relying on across-the-board rate
increases utilized by most carriers and rate bureaus prior to deregulation. In effect, carriers
are attempting to end cross-subsidization of freight transportation services in which some
freight pays higher rates than are cost justified so that other freight - typically small shipment, rural freight, or inexpensive merchandise-can be charged lower rates and still allow
the carrier to earn a reasonable profit. Sometimes this problem is justified by the "common
carrier obligation," pursuant to which most regulated carriers agree to transport all freight
for which they have governmental authority regardless of whether that freight represents a
profitable shipment for the carrier. See Freeman, supra note 63, at 64, 68, 72.
197. Id. at 72.
198. Freeman & Beilock, supra note 184, at 8-9. Sixty-four percent of household goods
carriers thought that their rates were higher under deregulation than they would have been
pursuant to continued regulation. Only 24% of the other carriers held this view.
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declining real rate levels, 15 service has remained constant, with shippers experiencing no appreciable service difficulties.20 o On-time performance, service
availability, number of service options, and freight loss and damage claims
have improved since deregulation. 20 1 Shippers are six times as likely to have
received offers of new service than to have reported service cutbacks or with2 02
drawals.
The fate of small and rural shippers, if the common carrier obligation and
rate regulation were terminated, caused concern prior to deregulation. While
there is some evidence in Florida that small or rural shippers are not benefiting
from deregulation as much as their large or urban counterparts, 2 3 they probably are better off under deregulation than would have been the case had
traditional regulation continued. 20 4 Nearly equal percentages of small and
large shippers report being offered new service, having lower rates, receiving
increased speed of service and experiencing greater competition for their
freight.205 Rural shippers were actually more likely to favor deregulation and
to report improved service, new service, lower rates, and special deals or discounts.206
Florida's experience with deregulation has not appreciably exacerbated
carrier bankruptcies and service problems. In many respects, the overall picture
is quite positive. The apparent success of deregulation, however, should not
blind other jurisdictions to the possibility of long-run effects on certain
transportation subsectors that will suffer greater deregulation side-effects than
normal. Household goods carriage, for example, contradicts the general rule
that deregulation results in lower rates.2 0 7 This may be due in part to the
inability of families to bargain for more favorable rates, the lack of repeat
business, the fact that many household movers are paid by third parties, and,
finally, the ability of established household goods carriers to charge premium
rates for reliable service. This possibility suggests regulation may be appropriate in limited cases involving little repeat business and non-commerciallyoriented shippers. Nevertheless, the overall success of Florida motor carrier
deregulation should serve as a positive example to other jurisdictions.
CONCLUSION

While there has been movement by many states toward a system of economic
regulation compatible with the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, most states continue
to regulate freight motor carriers in a traditional manner. Although it is likely
199. See supra note 185. Less than 10% of responding shippers noted declines in trucking
service either in the northbound or southbound directions.
200. Freeman, supra note 63, at 60-61. Only 11% of the shippers report service difficulties

resulting from motor carrier deregulation in Florida.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Freeman &Beilock, supra note 184, at 18-24 (manuscript). See also supra note 185.
204. Freeman & Beilock, supra note 184, at 22-24 (manuscript). See also supra note 185.
205. Freeman &Beilock, supra note 184, at 18-21 (manuscript). See also supra note 193.
206. See Freeman & Beilock, supra note 184, at 22-24 (manuscript).
207. See Freeman, supra note 63, at 71-72.
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many states will eventually fall into line behind the federal model, changes
may be a long time in coming. How important are these differences in federal
and state economic regulation? From a carrier perspective these economic
differences are probably less important than variations in licensing, taxation,
registration, and safety, which are more aggravating and yield greater paperwork and inefficiencies; however, any such inefficiencies leading to resource misallocation should be candidates for change.
If state economic regulation change is to occur, total deregulation should
prevail over partial deregulation or reregulation. The confusion resulting
from reregulation causes problems for both the shipping public and carriers,
as does the transition period during which state regulatory officials search for
the correct regulatory balance between carrier freedom and shipper protection.
In many jurisdictions, political realities may temper deregulation movements,
but Florida's experience should encourage deregulation proponents. Moreover,
indications that many organized motor carrier associations prefer deregulation
as the best alternative to reregulation should give hope to deregulation advocates.
Whether the federal model is the most effective and beneficial system of
motor carrier economic regulation remains to be seen. State regulatory experiments such as those outlined above will therefore be valuable in the national
debate over motor carrier regulation. Regulation is a fairly new game, and
states must have a reasonable amount of time to examine the facts and determine what innovations, if any, are necessary to promote just and fair competition among freight carriers.
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